Kurt Bassuener
November 19, 2026 08:02
The Trump administration’s preference for regional strongmen will encounter greater pushback after his midterm election setbacks – but lasting change in the Balkans also depends on the EU overcoming its aversion to people power.
Democratic Party wins in the US Congressional, state-level and local elections earlier this month offered a stinging rebuke to the Republican Party, which is now indelibly identified with President Donald Trump, who has dominated it following his nomination in 2016. It seems inconceivable that the party can separate itself from his legacy in the foreseeable future.
The Trump 2.0 administration’s impact on US relationships abroad in just two years is hard to overstate. From its weaponized (and backfiring) trade policy, the subjection of multigenerational alliances to unprecedented strain, threatening allies and neighbours with territorial grabs to a war launched with Israel against Iran – which has upended global energy markets and spurred inflation – American credibility and reliability have taken a self-inflicted beating.
The current Congress will remain in office, however, until January 3, 2027. A host of nominees, including ambassadors, are up for confirmation; there will likely be a rush to get as many over the line as possible while the Republicans maintain their majority. US ambassadors to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia may be among them.
While most visible vote since the Midterms – to impeach “Secretary of War” Pete Hegseth in the House – failed to fracture the Republican Party, some nominees may fall short.
The incoming Congress is likely to seek greater oversight over Trump’s foreign policy operations. The combination of Trump-connected business ventures with foreign policy will also be subjected to scrutiny, given the electorate’s deep frustration with apparent self-dealing.
But the administration may yet brazen it out, stonewall, and just hit the proverbial (and sometimes literal, as in the case of Bosnia) gas.
The Balkan region’s right-wing nationalist with the most recent electoral boost, Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik, has already sought to identify with and echo Trump’s unique brand of aggression and self-ascribed victimhood, accusing his critics of persecuting not just him but Serbs as a whole.
Dodik will seek to capitalize on Trump’s remaining time in office and to develop his ties to MAGA’s successors in American politics.
The Balkans received greater policy and media attention in the final month of the Midterm campaign, presumably gaining a scalp in Chief-of-Staff Susie Wiles. Her firing right after the Midterms is likely connected to her daughter’s public involvement in lobbying for Bosnia’s Serb-led entity, Republika Srpska.
But her replacement with the reactionary xenophobe Stephen Miller , who is reportedly preparing a stonewall/steamroll approach to Congressional oversight across the board, is no cause for celebration. His elevation to this role – having Trump’s ear and serving as gatekeeper for cabinet officials to the president – will further amplify his already powerful role in shaping policy.
His recorded positions across the board are antithetical to those proclaimed by democracy and rights exponents in the Balkans, Europe, and indeed the EU’s foundational values themselves. Miller has reportedly become close to Secretary of State and likely presidential hopeful Marco Rubio.
Challenges to status quo catch EU off guard
The most potent countermeasure to US’s malign influence in the region thus far has come from bottom-up in the Balkans. The October 25 parliamentary election victory of the Student List in Serbia against President Aleksandar Vucic focused on political and legal accountability. The opposition victory was boosted by the venture of Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, to raze and redevelop the General Staff building in downtown Belgrade.
Likewise, in nearby Albania, the ongoing six-month “Flamingo Revolution” protests against Prime Minister Edi Rama was catalyzed by a luxury development project in the Vjosa-Narta delta on the Adriatic, greenlit by Rama. A US administration inclined to one-stop shopping with strongmen has yet to develop an antidote to people power – once intimidation and repression fails.
However, the European Union also has demonstrated a deep-seated aversion to supporting people power, even when the demands from below largely coincide with its own declared values.
It clung to its relationship with Vucic until he lost decisively and conceded – and it remains unknowable what its policy response would have been had the result been less clear-cut.
Brussels only embraced the new Student List majority once the election projections were clear. It remains on the fence regarding Albania, sticking to a relationship with Rama which was just as personalized as that with Vucic, but considerably more accommodating in a geopolitical sense. The impression to be drawn from the region and beyond, is of a Union caught flatfooted by challenges to the status quo.
And, despite the pronounced change in US Congressional dominance made by voters in the Midterms, the challenges emanating from the Trump administration to the EU, its enlargement area, its interests, and values, will not be curtailed so long as Trump or MAGA hold executive power.
And the American challenge is not the only one buffeting the EU.
On the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC, meeting in Shenzhen, Chinese President Xi Jinping will host Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Trump for what might be termed a “Hegemons’ Summit”. This trio is at least implied in the US administration’s National Security and National Defense Strategies, issued in late 2025 and early 2026, respectively.
Ostensibly, the US-Israeli war on Iran will be on the agenda, along with artificial intelligence, but it is unlikely that Russia’s imperial assault on Ukraine and unrelenting aim to rewind the European security order by more than three decades will be absent.
While the EU and other Europe+ powers – most notably Canada and the UK – have recognised the challenge, no coherent strategic concept has resulted – let alone been operationalized. And as far as both Washington and Moscow are concerned, Europe as a whole is on the menu. That not only includes Ukraine, but the Western Balkans.
While the EU and Europe+ (the EU and its wider circle of allies, as represented in the “Coalition of the Willing”) have proven a vital lifeline and diplomatic support base for Ukraine’s war effort, the Western Balkans remains the only region where the EU can be decisive.
Yet, to date, the Union and its member states continue to attempt to patch up, rather than overhaul a Balkan policy that has been failing by its own metrics for two decades. At the same time, while the EU is still relatively popular compared to other geopolitical actors in the Western Balkans, it is far from universally so.
The further its policies toward the Balkans deviate from its proclaimed values and standards – on democracy, human rights, fighting corruption, or environmental protection – the more the EU’s relative valence diminishes. Increasingly, to repurpose a phrase recognisable to those leading Ireland’s presidency, Balkan peoples are concluding that those seeking dignity and agency can rely on “ourselves alone” rather than European solidarity.
Therefore, there is reason to hope that more Congressional and media daylight will shine on the Trump administration’s policies in Europe, including the so-called ‘Western Balkan Six’ states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia). But this alone cannot arrest the downward trajectory that Trump’s return accelerated but did not initiate.
Only the combined forces of popular democratic demand and European enlightened self-interest, in accord with its proclaimed values, can accomplish that. The opportunities are greater now than on November 2 – or October 24. What has been lacking is catalytic vision and leadership in several Western Balkan Six states – and in the EU and its member states.
Kurt Bassuener is co-founder and Senior Associate of the Democratization Policy Council, DPC, through which he has published numerous policy briefs.
The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of BIRN.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
International Relations
It’s Time ‘Europe+’ Asserted Leadership and Challenged the US in Bosnia
As Schmidt Abandons Bosnia’s ‘Mission Impossible’ – What Now?
Bosnia’s International Overseer Imposes New Rules to Curb Election Fraud


