Stavros Malichudis and Eleni Stamatoukou
November 20, 2026 08:01
Behind the ignominious fall of Donald Trump’s envoy to Athens is a very serious story about a questionable Greek pivot to US LNG in the face of cheaper alternatives and doubts over financing.
When Kimberly Guilfoyle resigned in mid-October, she made history. At 343 days, she was the shortest-serving US ambassador to Greece ever.
The former Fox News host and onetime fiancee of Donald Trump Jr was widely reported to have threatened to bring down the Greek government and to have demanded a “bribe” of $100,000 from an American businessman.
That was not all. Guilfoyle was also accused of promoting the interests of a private Greek construction firm called Aktor in the Vertical Gas Corridor , a US-backed energy project to transport US liquefied natural gas, LNG, from Greece to central and southeastern Europe, as well as Ukraine. She denied the claims against her.
Born in the wake of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea, VGC is a network of gas infrastructure being developed in stages and encompassing Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova, Ukraine and – this year – North Macedonia and Serbia, all with the aim of cutting the region’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels.
The project is seen as central to US interests in southeast Europe, and has been championed by Greece. Two days before Guilfoyle’s resignation, Greek Environment and Energy Minister Stavros Papastavrou said VGC “upgrades Greece’s role in the region”.
According to experts, Greece’s total investment in the expansion of VGC – with the construction of four new LNG terminals and accompanying pipeline infrastructure – could hit two billion euros.
That estimate is subject to cost changes along the way, even before factoring in the relatively high price of US LNG and doubts around any potential financing from the EU, which says its current natural gas transmission infrastructure “is sufficiently developed ”.
Money well spent? Some experts don’t think so, and point to data that suggests there are cheaper alternatives.
Some believe the Greek pivot toward US LNG is more about Athens aligning itself politically with Washington than any real economic benefit.
Greece “will pay,” said Sotiris Roussos, professor of International Relations at the University of the Peloponnese, “so that the US may have customers for its very expensive natural gas”.
US gas ‘much more expensive’
In 2021, the year before the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia was still the European Union’s biggest single supplier of natural gas, even after years of diversification efforts following the Crimea annexation.
That year, Russia accounted for roughly 40 per cent of EU imports of pipeline gas; by 2025, that figure had dropped to some six per cent. Over the same period, according to EU data , LNG imports from the US tripled, making the bloc the world’s largest importer of LNG. US LNG accounted for almost 58 per cent of total imports.
Days after Guilfoyle took up her post in Athens at the beginning of November last year, Greece and the US signed a series of energy agreements.
Among them, the Greek company Atlantic SEE LNG Trade S.A. , a joint venture between Aktor and Greek public gas corporation DEPA Commercial S.M.S.A., signed a deal with the US-based energy company Venture Global for the supply LNG in the amount of at least 0.5 million tonnes per annum over a period of 20 years, starting in 2030. The deal provided the option of an expanded purchase commitment up to approximately 1.5 million tonnes per annum.
Greek officials say the collaboration on the VGC is a project of “national importance”, but Roussos said that while Europe sheds its dependence on Russia, it risks falling into a new form of dependence: on American natural gas, which “is much more expensive than any competing natural gas, whether it’s Algerian, Iranian, Qatari, or Azeri”.
According to the Ohio-based Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, IIEFA, Greece “has been consistently paying the highest price for US LNG among EU Member States”.
In 2025, it said, Greece paid an average price of 38.7 euros per megawatt-hour, 12 per cent more than the average paid by EU countries.
The IEEFA forecasts that the US will become the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe and the EU in 2026, “while by 2028 it may cover 80 per cent of EU LNG imports”.
On average, however, “American LNG is the most expensive for European buyers”.
In an October op-ed in Kathimerini , Constantinos Filis, director of the Athens-based Institute of Global Affairs, IGA, and an Associate Professor at the American College of Greece, wrote: “The US, taking advantage of the EU’s inability to find suppliers capable of matching Russia in terms of volume, offered, at a higher cost, but in abundant supply, LNG to meet EU needs”.
“Furthermore, the decision to utilise the Vertical Corridor provided the project with the necessary momentum it had been seeking, given that European authorities were hesitant toward any plan that did not contribute to the green transition,” Filis wrote.
Andreas Stergiou, Professor of International Relations and European Relations in the Department of Economics at the University of Thessaly, told BIRN/Solomon: “What the US wants is first to sell energy and secondly to limit Russia’s geopolitical influence.”
Or as an official at Aktor put it, speaking on condition of anonymity: “Whoever controls energy, controls the world.”
‘Very uncompetitive’
The Aktor official was adamant that “there is no alternative” to the US in terms of natural gas.
But is that strictly true?
In September, Green Tank, a Greek non-profit environmental think tank, reported that transit costs to Ukraine, which has substantial gas needs, are up to 76 per cent cheaper when gas is supplied by other countries, such as Croatia, Germany, Lithuania or Poland, compared to US LNG supplied via Greece.
“We concluded that we [Greece] are very uncompetitive,” said Nikos Mantzaris, Senior Policy Analyst at Green Tank.
“There are more economical solutions, which any end consumer will naturally prefer.”
According to Green Tank, in the case of Hungary, the largest gas consumer in the VGC group, supply routes via Austria and Croatia are between 26 and 45 per cent cheaper.
Even Michalis Thomadakis, Director of Strategy & Development at the Greek natural gas transmission system operator, DESFA, said there are cheaper routes.
“If we aim at the markets of Central Europe, there are six to seven different flows for gas to be transported there from the coasts of Europe,” he said at an Athens energy conference organised by the Institute of Energy of South East Europe in early November. Thomadakis said gas transfers from Revithoussa, an onshore LNG terminal operational since 2000 on a small, uninhabited island in the Saronic Gulf, were “fourth cheapest” to Ukraine.
Additionally, countries like Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are on track to hit their targets for energy from renewable sources, which experts say is generally cheaper than gas.
The owner of Aktor, Alexandros Exarchou, argues the issue is not simply about price, but availability as well.
“The greatest risk for European Union member states is the inability to secure sufficient quantities,” he told the 16th Capital Link Greek Shipping Forum in February. “Long-term agreements are the key to ensuring energy supply and price stability.”
Roussos of the University of the Peloponnese said the only countries relatively close to Europe and which possess reserves “comparable to those of Russia” are Iran and Qatar.
Iran is the only country from which a pipeline could run through Turkey to Europe, and “would be cheaper”. But Iran is currently at war with the US.
Who will foot the bill?
Two LNG import terminals currently operate in Greece: Revithoussa and a Floating Storage and Regasification Unit, or FSRU, in Alexandroupolis [operational since late 2024].
Since 2019, Greece’s plans have included the development of three additional FSRUs: in Corinth, Volos and Thessaloniki, with an additional FSRU planned for Thrace to operate complementary to the Alexandroupolis terminal.
In his comments in February, Exarchou projected that demand along the VGC would reach 15 billion cubic metres annually by 2027; in an interview last month, he said Greece currently has the capacity to transfer up to 4.5 bcm per year.
Prominent Greek business interests would control all four terminals:
Dioriga Gas FSRU in Corinth: being developed by Motor Oil, owned by the influential Vardinogiannis family; Aktor is also discussing its involvement.
Argos FSRU in Volos: owned by the Dragnis shipping family.
Thessaloniki FSRU, by Elpedison: 100 per cent controlled by HELLENiQ ENERGY [formerly Hellenic Petroleum].
The investment in the new FSRU in Thrace belongs to Gastrade SA , a joint venture formed by five equal partners including the Copelouzos Group, which has interests in energy, infrastructure and real estate.
Mantzaris, of Green Tank, said the four terminals would cost in excess of a billion euros to build, according to conservative estimates, before the cost of pipeline expansions, infrastructure upgrades and other elements that could push the figure up to two billion. BIRN’s own analysis of cost figures quoted in media reports suggest the total bill, for the terminals alone, could surpass 1.5 billion euros.
The extent of state and/or EU financing for the projects has yet to be announced. Without such subsidies, experts are sceptical of their long-term viability.
According to an analysis by Greenpeace Greece , the Alexandroupolis facility was built with the help of some 274 million euros in EU funds. The total investment cost, according to Dimitris Copelouzos , head of the Copelouzos Group, stood at 490 million euros.
A previous upgrade of the Revithoussa terminal, in 2007 and 2018, cost approximately 91 million euros, of which nearly 32 million euros came from EU resources.
Copelouzos says the new Thrace terminal, essentially an expansion of Alexandroupolis, would cost 650 million euros, but it appears unlikely to secure European funding given the bloc no longer deems fossil gas projects eligible and the European Investment Bank no longer issues loans for such projects.
Kostis Sifnaios, the CEO of Gastrade, which controls the project, has stated that for the Thrace investment, they are seeking “long-term capacity booking agreements” because “economic viability depends on the existence of long-term contracts”.
In a meeting with journalists in December 2025, Copelouzos stated : “We know that the second FSRU will be a low-yield project.”
“Whoever builds the second FSRU will be a benefactor to the country. If someone builds a third, they will be a ruined benefactor,” he said.
It’s a similar story in Corinth: according to Motor Oil, which is developing the project, the unit’s viability and competitiveness are impossible without “state aid”.
Roussos told BIRN/Solomon: “In Greece, companies have learned not to pay for anything.”
“The actual capital invested by the companies themselves is extremely small,” he said. “This isn’t a phenomenon unique to Greece, but in Greece it has truly gone too far.”
Filis, in his article, wrote: “the volatility of the energy market reinforces the strategic necessity of the Vertical Corridor, while simultaneously hindering its commercial viability”.
It remains unclear how much the VGC expansion will cost and how it will be financed, but infrastructure budgets have a habit of ballooning.
Citing public documents and data obtained via Freedom of Information requests, Bankwatch gas expert Raluca Petru said that in Romania, Transgaz, the national gas transmission system operator, itself initially estimated the cost of an infrastructure upgrade on the Romanian stretch of VGC at 25 million euros; it ultimately asked for 100 million euros from public money.
The documents show the company tried to secure funding from the EU’s Modernisation Fund – created to help lower income member states hit their energy targets. According to the Evaluation of the Modernisation Fund, a report commissioned by the European Commission and published this year, the European Investment Bank ultimately rejected the request because it failed to meet emissions reduction requirements.
In response to this story, Greece’s DESFA said an assessment of “remaining bottlenecks” and “potential investment” was ongoing, and that it expects results by the end of this year.
“Th e Vertical Corridor is primarily about making better use of existing infrastructure across Southeast Europe, complemented by targeted investments where additional capacity is needed,” the gas transmission system operator said.
DESFA stressed it would assess any additional investments based on security of supply, system resilience, actual market needs, economic viability, and expected demand, with costs recovered through the applicable regulatory framework.
“Our priority is to ensure efficient infrastructure development, while avoiding unnecessary investments and limiting additional costs for system users.”
Regarding reducing VGC transportation costs, DESFA said it requires “improving coordination between transmission system operators” and more efficient use of “the existing infrastructure”.
“While the overall cost of transportation depends on several factors, including tariffs across the participating countries, these adjustments represent an important step towards improving the competitiveness of the Corridor,” it said.
The Greek Ministry of Environment and Energy said it did not have time to respond to a request for comment; neither Aktor nor Depa responded.
Deals struck in Albania and Bosnia. Ukraine?
Aktor was previously known as a construction company, but in 2025 it branched out into the energy sector with the creation of Atlantic SEE LNG Trade S.A.
According to The Wall Street Journal , Guilfoyle travelled to Davos on a private jet belonging to Aktor owner Exarchou and over the span of a few months “ helped corral a half-dozen countries—from Albania to Romania and Ukraine—into signing memorandums of understanding or other statements” that signalled their interest in buying US LNG, particularly via Aktor.
WSJ also reported that Christos Marafatsos, a Greek-American entrepreneur and Aktor lobbyist, joined Guilfoyle in her meetings with government officials.
Exarchou did not deny giving Guilfoyle a lift to Davos, but said that all required procedures were followed; he said that Aktor is not Marafatsos’ only client and denied any wrongdoing.
During her brief tenure in Greece, Guilfoyle is recorded as having travelled widely in the region to promote US LNG. In that time, Exarchou appears to have found a market in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina for the US LNG he trades.
On April 28, Aktor LNG USA, a US subsidiary of Aktor, signed a 20-year commercial agreement with Albanian state-owned natural gas company ALBGAZ for the sale of US LNG to Albania, with estimated revenues of six billion euros over the full term of the contract.
A day later, Aktor LNG USA signed a 20-year agreement with ALUMINIJ INDUSTRIES in Bosnia and its parent company, M.T. Abraham, for the supply of 0.5 billion cubic metres per year, commencing in 2030. Revenues for the entire duration of the agreement are estimated at three billion euros.
In October, Exarchou said that the quantity of US LNG that his company has agreed to buy from Venture Global between 2030-2050 is covered by these two agreements.
At the same time, Aktor LNG USA signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the development, construction and operation of a natural gas-fired power plant with a capacity of approximately 380 MW in Albania. Furthermore, an agreement was reached regarding future cooperation on the development, construction and operation of a natural gas-fired power plant in Mostar, Bosnia.
Last year, Aktor’s Atlantic SEE LNG Trade S.A. signed Memorandums of Understanding with the state-owned Ukrainian company Naftogaz, Romanian Nova Power & Gas and the Romanian state company Transgaz concerning the supply of LNG from January 1, 2030; Naftogaz expressed interest in purchasing up to 0.7 million tons of LNG per year, and the Romanians up to 1.4 million tons.
Exarchou argues that “long-term agreements are the key to ensuring energy supply and price stability”.
Aktor, in its 2025 report, cites a first agreement for the sale of LNG in Ukraine, which Aktor will procure from American BP and sell to Naftogaz. The volume is not mentioned, however.
Indeed, in a recent gas auction , Naftogaz did not express any interest in the supply of US LNG through Greece.
Naftogaz told the WSJ it had discontinued negotiations with Aktor.
Meanwhile, Albania’s Energy Ministry said it wasn’t fully convinced its arrangement with Aktor’s Atlantic SEE LNG Trade would be economically viable and was waiting for a completed feasibility study.
Exarchou said in October it was “a done deal, not subject to conditions”. The MoU with Romanian Transgaz has since expired , while Romanian gas producer Romgaz reportedly rejected a proposal for the supply of US LNG by Atlantic SEE LNG Trade for 20 years, after identifying potential annual losses of 50 to 310 million euros.
Giorgos Polychroniou, a management consultant to DEPA, said that Romania was working on opening its own gas facility in 2027 to fill roughly half the gap created by the loss of Russian gas.
EU: natural gas infrastructure ‘sufficiently developed’
An EU official, speaking on condition of anonymity, acknowledged the “important role” played by US LNG in supporting the bloc’s “phase-out” of Russian gas.
While the EU is “closely monitoring” VGC, the official said, its current priority is “to maximise the efficient use of infrastructure that is already in place”.
The natural gas transmission infrastructure of the EU “is sufficiently developed, well-interconnected and flexible” to enable its members to access LNG and pipeline imports from a diversity of sources.
IEEFA, which tracks global energy data, estimates that Europe will expand its LNG import capacity by six per cent in 2026, with the total expansion of LNG import capacity between 2023 and 2025 reaching 24 per cent.
At the same time, however, IEEFA notes that “the continent has swapped its dependence on Russian pipeline gas for exposure to LNG, which is priced in volatile global markets”.
On the other hand, demand for natural gas is declining.
If Europe maintains its efforts to curb gas consumption, IEEFA projects “that LNG import capacity in 2030 could exceed total natural gas demand and stand at three times the demand for LNG”.
Even Greece’s own National Energy and Climate Plan sets a target of covering over 90 per cent of domestic electricity generation from renewable energy sources by 2035.
So why the clamour for US LNG?
In 2024, The New York Times described the primary payoff for Greece from its pivot toward US LNG for export purposes as “political, not economic”.
“Greece positions itself as central to European energy security, and it plays a key role in the West’s strategy to isolate Russia,” the newspaper wrote, but the “real money will go to American gas companies”.
Experts speaking to BIRN/Solomon also said they believe Greece’s energy policy is being driven by a determination to align more closely with the US.
“We want to be the ‘good child’ for the US and align ourselves with US policies in the region,” said Roussos. “The reason is obvious: we believe that, geopolitically, we are playing a role that will, to some extent, enhance the country’s importance.”
And yet, he said, “we do not wish to raise the issue of any quid pro quo. We receive no royalties, nor do we collect transit fees.”
Lobbying against methane restrictions
Economics aside, there are the environmental ramifications of Greece’s energy policy to be considered too.
Recently, the Greek government through HELLENiQ ENERGY, formerly Hellenic Petroleum, has signed a series of agreements with US oil giants Chevron and ExxonMobil for hydrocarbon exploration in maritime areas south of Crete and the Peloponnese , in the northwestern Ionian Sea, as well as in the Southern Ionian Sea.
“We firmly believe in the Vertical Corridor as an alternative to Russian gas,” Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said at one of the signing ceremonies in February 2026.
“We also want to produce our own natural gas,” he said. “Europe needs it, and we want to supply it.”
Stergiou, of the University of Thessaly, said the granting of licences for hydrocarbon extraction was “criminal for the environment, for future generations, and for the Mediterranean as well”.
In October 2024, a study by Cornell University in the US found the environmental footprint of LNG over a 20-year timeframe to be 33 per cent worse than coal.
Throughout the entire LNG supply chain of LNG – extraction, transport, regasification – extensive methane leaks occur. Methane is over 80 times more harmful to the atmosphere than carbon dioxide.
Last month, the European Parliament voted to postpone until 2030 the Methane Regulation that would have required oil and gas companies to record methane emissions, improve infrastructure and address leaks.
Ten of 21 Greek MEPs took part in the vote. Fredi Beleri, Manolis Kefalogiannis and Dimitris Tsiodras – all MEPs from the Greek ruling party New Democracy, voted in favour of the postponement, as did Emmanouil Fragkos of the right-wing populist party Greek Solution.
Politico reported that the vote came “after a months-long pressure campaign by oil and gas companies”.
Just before the vote, US oil giant ExxonMobil paid $31,500 to publish an opinion article in Politico arguing against the imposition of such restrictions.
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